A second chance for Russia to prove itself

Vladimir Putin has been especially forthright not only in his condemnation of the terrorist attacks on the United States last week, but also in his expressed desire to stand squarely with the democracies. It is a heartening response from a state whose historic involvement (as part of the Soviet Union) in Afghanistan created conditions that facilitated the rise of the most fanatical forms of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism, and whose more recent military and economic dealings with pariah states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran have cast considerable doubt on its commitment to democracy and on its proclaimed goal of becoming a member of the community of democratic states.

Russia is now faced with a stark choice, and an important historic opportunity. A profound change occurred in the international system on Sept. 11. The willingness to tolerate, excuse or even explain terrorism is evaporating in the West, and especially in the United States. Though the United States and its democratic allies, driven by tactical considerations, may in the short term make deals with some unsavoury regimes in the fight against terrorism, there is little doubt that in the long term these democracies will construct deep, meaningful and trusting international relations only with other like-minded democracies.

Russia's extensive ties with rogue states, including those that clearly support terrorism, and its more recent attempts to strengthen military relations with them look like a particularly dangerous game now. Russia's coddling of North Korea's Kim Jong-il is an example. His is the same regime that has yet to account for all its plutonium and has supplied advanced missile technology to Iran.

Further, Russia, which in the first half of the 1990s sold Iran US $5-billion worth of weapons, has been trying to complete a sale package of sophisticated arms to Tehran, worth US $10-billion. Though the government of Mohammad Khatami presents a faсade of moderation and has little time for the Taleban in Afghanistan, the real power in Iran is Ayatollah Khamenei and the Council of Guardians, whose Islamist hatred of democracies and the West is unrelenting.

Moscow, as well, seems intent on making armament sales to Syria (a country on the U.S. State Department list of states that support terrorism). Damascus is known to harbour terrorist groups in Syria and Lebanon, including the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Lastly, Moscow has worked assiduously to undermine the sanctions against Saddam Hussein, despite that country's expulsion of arms inspectors, continuing threats against its neighbours and support of terrorism.

Nevertheless, Putin's foreign policy is characterized more by opportunism than cold anti-Western calculation. It has been influenced more by some ill-considered old Soviet notions of strengthening Russian international influence by collecting or co-ordinating a motley group of American-hating states, and by a misguided desire to keep alive oversized, corrupt, moribund and parasitic military industries, than by a clear strategic vision. The Putin government now will have to re-examine its basic assumptions and define its foreign policy goals clearly. It will have to do so because of international pressure. Yet, it will make a mistake if it also fails to view this process as a historic opportunity.

First, a Russia that fully supports the war against terrorism is much more likely to be given a sympathetic hearing regarding its vital political, economic and security concerns, whether these involve rescheduling and forgiving loans, membership in the World Trade Organization, delaying or reshaping further NATO enlargement, or perhaps even opening up the alliance to Russian membership. For Russia can play a pivotal role in fighting terrorism by helping to deny states that support terrorism sophisticated weapons and international legitimacy. Further, with military bases in Tajikistan and great influence in the other former Soviet Central Asian republics that border Afghanistan, Moscow could make a huge difference by helping, or at least not opposing, American requests for access to military facilities in these states.

Second, the Putin government simply cannot afford additional delays and detours in putting Russia on a realistic and sustainable track to domestic political and economic transformation just as it changes its foreign policy. It has fallen too far behind its former East European allies. Unfortunately, Moscow has frittered away much of the historic opportunity it had following 1991, even though it can point to a number of significant achievements. Putin, therefore, should use external necessity to strengthen his hand and push harder for domestic change, for a realistic macroeconomic policy and balanced and sustainable growth. Thereby he could better fuse the domestic and foreign factors -- a model that has been proven so successful in a number of East European states.

The political will to change, however, is crucial. Moscow needs to realize that any benefits it may have received from its relations with rogue states have been illusory. Worse, such relations have cast doubt on Russia's commitment to democracy and international stability, and have encouraged corrupt and anti-democratic forces within Russia. Though some Russian officials will continue to delude themselves into thinking, for instance, that massive arms sales or building a nuclear reactor in Iran vitally support Russia's flagging arms and nuclear industries, and moderate Tehran's behaviour, the reality  is that these create a more dangerous neighbour on Russia's border. Furthermore, when up to 80% of Russia's defence production is exported -- and Iran is one of the main patrons of Russia's oversized defence industry -- it is time for the Putin government to understand the irony that it is Iran and other large purchasers who are now more likely the "patrons," with Russia as the "client" state.

The West needs Russia, with its vast territory, geographic centrality, enormous resources, huge intelligence network and extensive experience in the fight against terrorism. It should be sympathetic and generous to a Russia genuinely committed to that war. But Russia itself must undertake major changes, primarily out of enlightened self-interest. It needs to recognize that it faces not only external pressure, but also a second historic opportunity. Countries rarely get such a second chance. It would be imprudent for Moscow not to avail itself of this and think that there will be a third.